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Towards a Better Understanding of Lawyers’  
Judgmental Biases in Client Representation:  
The Role of Need for Cognitive Closure 
James H. Stark and Maxim Milyavsky* 
ABSTRACT 
 
Previous research demonstrates that lawyers and law students are, on 
average, prone to overconfidence bias and self-serving judgments of 
fairness when they take on a representative lawyering role. This is the first 
study to investigate individual differences in susceptibility to these biases. 
Expanding on two previous experiments, and utilizing as our sample 468 
law students from twelve geographically diverse U.S. law schools, we 
examined whether differences in students’ Need for Cognitive Closure 
(NFC) — a motivational desire for clear answers over ambiguity — would 
affect both their judicial outcome predictions and their assessments of the 
“fair settlement value” of a simulated personal injury case when assigned 
randomly to the role of plaintiff’s or defendant’s counsel. We also 
investigated whether high- or low-NFC scores would have any effect on 
the efficacy of a “consider-the-opposite” (“list the weaknesses of your 
case”) prompt given to half of our subjects in an effort to de-bias these 
assessments. We found that a high need for closure intensifies self-serving 
bias in both students’ judicial predictions and fair value assessments, and 
that bias in students’ judicial predictions could be mitigated through de-
biasing interventions, even with students high in need for closure. Bias in 
fairness assessments persisted, despite de-biasing prompts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Beginning students often enter law school expecting that the rules they 
study will provide clear and ready answers to legal problems. “What is the 
governing rule?” they want to know. “What is the answer to this 
hypothetical?” But the world of the practicing lawyer is, as often as not, 
clouded by ambiguity:   The law may be vague or in flux.  Conflicting 
legal rules may bear upon a single problem. The evidence needed to 
resolve the problem may be unavailable, incomplete or contradictory. 
Predicting the vagaries of human behavior is often dicey. Thus, advising 
clients about complex future events—how a judge or jury might resolve a 
disputed claim, how a business competitor might respond to a buyout offer 
or threatened lawsuit, whether a government official will react favorably 
to one or another set of arguments offered on the client’s behalf--often 
involves considerable uncertainty. 
As law professors, we attempt to stimulate in our students flexible 
thinking and an appreciation for legal and factual indeterminacy. A former 
law dean1 had a stock orientation speech in which he exhorted students on 
their first day of law school to “revel in the ambiguity.” The leading law 
school exam study guide, entitled “Getting to Maybe,” is to similar effect.2 
We spend three years with our students deconstructing legal texts, 
considering whether appellate decisions were adequately reasoned and 
rightly decided, and trying to promote multi-sided class-room discussions 
of complex (and sometimes “hot button”) issues. In the spirit of liberal arts 
educators everywhere, we hope that with the proper training, we can 
inculcate dispassionate, open-minded judgment on the part of all our 
students. But is this realistic?  
Previous empirical research has demonstrated the overall tendency of 
lawyers to adopt a too favorable view of the merits of their cases—a 
 
1. The late George Schatzki, Dean of the University of Connecticut School of Law from 1994 to 
2000. 
2. RICHARD MICHAEL FISCHL & JEREMY R. PAUL, GETTING TO MAYBE: HOW TO EXCEL ON LAW 
SCHOOL EXAMS (1999). The authors write: “What you will find inside the typical law school exam 
question is ambiguity, and we think that learning to live with it—indeed, learning to search it out and 
exploit it—is the key to doing well on law school exams.” Id. at 17.  
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phenomenon that we term partisan role bias.3 The present study explores 
whether such general findings mask important differences among 
individuals in their tendency towards such self-serving bias. Our principal 
hypothesis is that law students, like individuals generally, vary 
substantially in their open-mindedness and tolerance for ambiguity; and 
that these differences are likely to predict their susceptibility to partisan 
bias when they make legal predictions and engage in fairness assessments 
in a representative lawyering role. 
The question presented, which has not previously been investigated, is 
one with potentially significant policy implications. To the extent that 
partisan role biases affect lawyers, leading them to engage in “we-they” 
thinking or provide overly optimistic predictions to their clients about trial 
outcomes and other future events, this can prolong conflicts and impose 
substantial costs on both clients and society. As the authors of one study 
put it, it would be a matter of “high public interest” if bias reduction could 
be achieved in the general realm of legal decision making.4  Understanding 
the sources of self-serving bias and its variations among lawyers could 
provide useful information in pursuit of the goal of bias reduction. 
This article is divided into four Parts. In Part One, we describe the 
empirical studies that formed the basis for our experiment. Part Two sets 
out the methodology and design of our study, as well as our research 
hypotheses.  In Parts Three and Four, we describe our results and discuss 
their possible limitations and implications.  We close with some brief 
thoughts about possible areas for future research.   
 
 
 
3. Throughout this article, we use the terms “partisan role bias” and “partisan bias” as umbrella 
terms encompassing a variety of judgmental biases that affect individuals when they are placed in a 
partisan lawyering stance. We are particularly interested in egocentric overconfidence and self-serving 
assessments of fairness. As applied to other non-legal and legal actors, this bias has sometimes been 
called “myside bias”, see e.g., JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING (4th ed. 2008), 
“allegiance bias”, see, e.g., Keith D. Markman & Edward R. Hirt, Social Prediction and the 
“Allegiance Bias”, 20 SOC. COGNITION 58 (2002), or “adversarial allegiance bias”. See, e.g., Bradley 
D. McAulliff & Jeana L. Arter, Adversarial Allegiance: The Devil Is in the Evidence Details, Not Just 
on the Witness Stand, 40 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 524 (2016).  
4. Christopher Engel & Andreas Glöckner, Role-Induced Bias in Court: An Experimental 
Analysis, 26 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 272, 273 (2012). 
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I. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
 
Three lines of empirical research bear upon the current investigation: 1) 
studies of the effects of various judgmental biases on disputants and 
lawyers; 2) attempts to reduce some of these biases through “consider-the-
opposite” de-biasing interventions; and 3) general explorations of 
motivational differences that may affect individuals’ susceptibility to 
judgmental bias in the first place.    
 
A. Judgmental Biases in Disputing 
 
Dispute resolution scholars have long recognized that, when placed in 
an adversary stance, disputants and their lawyers are susceptible to 
judgmental biases. These cognitive and motivational distortions include 
(but are not limited to) primacy effects; confirmation bias; the 
fundamental attribution error; and egocentric and self-serving biases, 
including inappropriate levels of confidence in one’s judgment and 
decision-making abilities, contributions to past outcomes, and ability to 
predict or positively control future ones.5   
A number of real-world studies demonstrate, for example, that litigators 
are more confident than accurate in their predictions of future trial 
verdicts.6  A 2008 empirical study of settlement decision making in 2000 
California civil trials found that litigants and their attorneys commonly 
made serious settlement errors, rejecting negotiation offers better (often 
 
5. For general reviews, see Robert S. Adler, Flawed Thinking: Addressing Decision Biases in 
Negotiation, 20 OHIO STATE J. DISP. RESOL. 685 (2005); Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological 
Principles in Negotiating Civil Settlements, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (1999); Russell Korobkin & 
Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. 
L. REV. 107, 110 (1994); Douglas N. Frenkel & James H. Stark, Improving Lawyers' Judgment: Is 
Mediation Training De-Biasing, 21 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2015). 
6. See. e.g., Elizabeth F. Loftus & Willem A. Wagenaar, Lawyers’ Predictions of Success, 28 
JURIMETRICS J. 437 (1988); Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers' Ability to 
Predict Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCH., PUB. POL’Y & L. 133, 133–57 (2010). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol59/iss1/12
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substantially so) than the results they achieved at trial.7  Neither the 
number of years of a lawyer’s experience nor the ranking of his or her law 
school affected these error rates.  Aggregated, these decisional errors were 
estimated to cost the clients in these matters more than $1 billion, not 
including additional trial costs and attorneys’ fees.8    
The effects of overconfidence bias on disputing behavior have also been 
demonstrated in several simulation studies, suggesting that even random 
assignment to a simulated partisan role can lead to significant distortions 
in the way that subjects assess evidence, make predictions, and behave. 
Such partisan role bias has been shown to affect both parties9  and their 
agent-representatives.10 
One illustrative experiment involving parties (which we build on here 
and is discussed in greater detail below), found that undergraduate and law 
student subjects, given identical case file materials from a factually 
ambiguous personal injury case, had widely different predictions of the 
most likely judicial outcome, depending on whether they were assigned to 
the plaintiff or defendant role.11 The researchers also found strong 
evidence of biased assimilation of the information provided, both in 
students’ recall and weighting of arguments: each side recalled more 
arguments favoring their side’s position than those favoring the other side, 
and each believed that a judge or jury would find “their” arguments 
superior to opposing ones.12 In a more recent study involving party 
representatives, Eigen and Listokin found that first year law students, 
randomly assigned to argue one side or another of closely-balanced 
 
7. Randall Kiser et al., Let's Not Make a Deal: An Empirical Study of Decision Making in 
Unsuccessful Settlement Negotiations, 55 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 551, 590 (2008) (finding that 
plaintiffs and defendants made settlement errors at a rate of 61% and 24% respectively, but that 
defense errors tended to be “whoppers,” with a mean error size of $1,140,000 compared to a mean 
error size for plaintiffs of $43,100); RANDALL KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG: THE POWER OF 
EFFECTIVE DECISION MAKING FOR ATTORNEYS AND CLIENTS (2010). 
8. KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 7, at 42-43. 
9. Leigh Thompson & George Loewenstein, Egocentric Interpretations of Fairness and 
Interpersonal Conflict, 51 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 176, 192 (1992). 
10. Engel & Glöckner, supra note 4, at 1; Zev J. Eigen & Yair Listokin, Do Lawyers Really Believe 
Their Own Hype, and Should They? A Natural Experiment, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 239, 264 (2012). 
11. George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. 
LEGAL STUD., 135, 150 (1993). This study is discussed in more detail, infra Part I.D. 
12. Id., at 154-55.  
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appellate legal problem on behalf of a client in a moot court competition, 
each believed on average that the merits favored their side.13    
In addition to distorting predictive accuracy in valuing cases, partisan 
role bias has also been shown to affect fairness assessments in bargaining. 
In general, when people are placed in competitive roles or settings 
involving conflict, their views of fairness are tinged with self-interest.14 
The fundamental attribution error can lead disputants to attribute hostile 
meanings to other people’s motives in conflict settings, increasing 
“hawkish” behaviors and making the resolution of disputes more 
difficult.15 When bargaining, negotiators often “reactively devalue” 
settlement offers made by the opposing side, simply on account of their 
source.16  
These kinds of biases often affect us unconsciously. Empirical research 
suggests that most human beings suffer from a bias “blind spot,” causing 
them to think that “other people” are biased, while they are fair and 
objective.17 In part for this reason, neither instructing people about the 
distorting effects of biases on human decision making, nor admonishing 
them to be “fair and objective” has been found to be effective in reducing 
 
13. Eigen & Listokin, supra note 10, at 263-64 and passim. 
14. See, e.g., Leigh L. Thompson & Brian J. Lucas, Judgmental Biases in Conflict Resolution and 
How to Overcome Them, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 213, 255 (2000); Paul W. 
Paese & Robert D. Yonker, Toward a Better Understanding of Egocentric Fairness Judgments in 
Negotiation, 12 INT’L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 114, 128 (2001). 
15. See, e.g., Volkan Topalli & Edgar C. O'Neal, Retaliatory Motivation Enhances Attributions of 
Hostility When People Process Ambiguous Social Stimuli, 29 AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 155, 167 (2003); 
Daniel Kahneman & Jonathan Renshon, Hawkish Biases, in AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE 
POLITICS OF FEAR: THREAT INFLATION SINCE 9/11 79 (A. Trevor Thrall & Jane Cramer eds., 2009). 
16. Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in BARRIERS TO 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 26 (Kenneth Arrow et al., eds., 1995). 
17. See, e.g., Emily Pronin, Perception and Misperception of Bias in Human Judgment, 11 TRENDS 
IN COGNITIVE SCI., 37, 41 (2007); Emily Pronin et al., Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder: 
Divergent Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 111 PSYCHOL. REV. 781, 797 (2004); Emily 
Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 369 (2002) [hereinafter, Pronin et al., PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol59/iss1/12
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judgmental distortions.18 Monetary incentives, even substantial ones, have 
also been shown to have little effect in improving accuracy in predicting 
future court outcomes.19 
     
B. De-biasing by “Considering the Opposite” 
       
By contrast, one de-biasing technique that has shown considerable 
experimental success involves “consider the opposite” (CTO) prompts—
interventions that ask subjects to generate, list, explain or imagine in detail 
reasons why their answer, hypothesis, prediction of future events or 
proposed decisions might be wrong. CTO prompts are a form of “counter-
attitudinal advocacy”20--role-playing exercises in which subjects are 
invited to generate and articulate opinions that may not correspond with 
their inner convictions. 21  
Consider-the-opposite prompts have been shown to reduce cognitive 
biases and improve decision making in a variety of domains not involving 
strong motivational investment. For example, they have been found to 
reduce subjects’ overconfidence in the accuracy of their answers to general 
knowledge questions;22 to reduce belief persistence in the face of 
 
18. Hal R. Arkes, Impediments to Accurate Clinical Judgment and Possible Ways to Minimize Their 
Impact, 49 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 323, 327 (1981) (characterizing the technique of 
instructing subjects about a particular bias and then telling them not to influenced by it as “absolutely 
worthless,” citing sources); Charles G. Lord et al., Considering the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy 
for Social Judgment, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231, 1233-1234 (instruction to “weigh all 
the evidence in a fair and impartial manner” ineffective in reducing bias); Pronin et al., PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL., supra note 17, at 378 and passim  (learning about biases ineffective in 
reducing their effects).  
19. Engel & Glöckner, supra note 4, at 278. (Student research participants offered 100 euros for 
accurate predictions of court ruling in simulated criminal case in which they assumed the role of 
defense counsel or prosecutor; financial incentive failed to reduce partisan role bias in their 
predictions.) 
20. See, e.g., Richard L. Miller & William Wozniak, Counter-Attitudinal Advocacy: Effort vs. Self-
Generation of Arguments, 6 CURRENT RESEARCH IN SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 46 (2001).   
21. For early work in this field, see Irving L. Janis & Bert T. King, The Influence of Role Playing 
on Opinion Change, 49 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 211 (1954); Bert T. King & Irving L. Janis, 
Comparison of the Effectiveness of Improvised Versus Non-improvised Role-playing in Producing 
Opinion Changes, 9 HUM. REL. 177 (1956). 
22. Asher Koriat et al., Reasons for Confidence, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. LEARNING & 
MEMORY 107 (1980). 
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disconfirming evidence;23 and to improve evaluation of complex data in 
decision-making.24 Human beings are susceptible to cognitive biases 
because even when they know that the best decisions will be produced by 
considering all sides of a question, they tend to engage in one-sided 
thinking.25 They rely on heuristics to arrive at their decisions and often 
truncate the search for additional information.26 CTO prompts appear to 
improve open-mindedness by reducing people's natural resistance to the 
consideration of alternatives once they have settled upon a focal 
hypothesis.27 
Of course, cognitive biases often come in stronger, motivated forms as 
well.28 Motivational biases are judgmental distortions caused by a desire 
to believe something, whether because of ego investment, ideological 
commitment, or a stake in the outcome.29 For example, when people with 
strong commitments to a political ideology are confronted with evidence 
that contradicts their beliefs, they tend to ignore or discount it--the 
“irrational belief persistence effect.”30 Even here, consider-the-opposite 
prompts have shown some promise in reducing bias.31    
In studies of case valuation and disputing, consider-the-opposite 
prompts have generated mixed results. In one negotiation simulation 
 
23. Craig A. Anderson, Inoculation and Counter-Explanation: Debiasing Techniques in the 
Perseverance of Social Theories, 1 SOC. COGNITION 126 (1982). 
24. Laura J. Kray & Adam D. Galinsky, The Debiasing Effect of Counterfactual Mind-Sets: 
Increasing the Search for Disconfirmatory Information in Group Decisions, 91 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 69 (2003). 
25. BARON, supra note 3, at 55-58; Derek J. Koehler, Explanation, Imagination, and Confidence in 
Judgment, 110 PSYCHOL. BULL. 499 (1991); Michael R. P. Dougherty et al., The Role of Mental 
Simulation in Judgments of Likelihood, 70 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 135 (1997). 
26. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (1982). 
27. Koehler, supra note 25, at 502; Edward R. Hirt & Keith D. Markman, Multiple Explanation: A 
Consider-an-Alternative Strategy for Debiasing Judgments, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
1069, 1083 (1995). 
28. See, e.g., Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many 
Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 176 (1998). 
29. BARON, supra note 3, at 55, 199, 212. 
30 . Id. 
31. See e.g., Lord et al., supra note 18, at 1231-37 (modifying previously-held views about capital 
punishment); Stephen J. Hoch, Counterfactual Reasoning and Accuracy in Predicting Future Personal 
Events, 11. J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 719 (1985) (mitigating overconfident predictions by MBA 
students regarding the timing and number of job offers they expected to receive upon graduation). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol59/iss1/12
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study, discussed further below,32 researchers found that a CTO “list the 
weaknesses in your case” instruction was highly effective at reducing 
overconfidence bias in case valuation. However, in a subsequent study of 
overconfidence bias on the part of practicing lawyers in actual cases, 
researchers were unable to replicate this result. Commenting on the 
discrepancy between their research findings and those reported in the 
earlier simulation study, the authors commented: “[a] more profound 
investment in the outcome of real-life cases may increase resistance to de-
biasing interventions.”33  
 
C. The Need for Cognitive Closure 
 
The present study expands on previous research by examining whether 
individual differences—specifically differences regarding tolerance for 
ambiguity and open-mindedness—affect law students’ susceptibility to 
judgmental biases. Dispositional open versus closed-mindedness has been 
a subject of considerable social science research for more than thirty years 
and has been investigated in variety of ways. It has not, however, 
previously been a focus of much dispute resolution scholarship.34  
In this study, we utilize a psychometric scale called the “Need for (Non-
specific) Cognitive Closure Scale” (NFCS) to measure individual 
differences in this motivational trait.35 Need for Cognitive Closure (NFC) 
refers to the extent to which individuals tend to prefer an answer—any 
answer—to ambiguity or confusion. It is a generalized need, to be 
distinguished from the need for specific closure, i.e., the desire for 
particular answers to questions for specific (e.g., ego-protecting) reasons. 
Although environmental factors have been shown to affect individuals’ 
 
32. Linda Babcock et al., Creating Convergence: Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 L. & SOC. 
INQUIRY 913, 919 (1998). For further discussion of this study, see infra Part I.D. 
33 . Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 6, at 151. 
34. But see, Carsten K. W. de Dreu et al., On the Seizing and Freezing of Negotiator Inferences: 
Need for Cognitive Closure Moderates the Use of Heuristics in Negotiation, 25 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 348, 348 (1999). 
35. Arie W. Kruglanski et al., Motivated Resistance and Openness to Persuasion in the Presence or 
Absence of Prior Information, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 861, 876 (1993); Donna M. 
Webster et al., Motivated Language Use in Intergroup Contexts: Need-for-Closure Effects on the 
Linguistic Intergroup Bias, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1122, 1125 (1997). 
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desire for closure in specific settings,36 NFC is also believed to be a stable 
individual motivational disposition, unrelated to a person’s general 
intelligence.37  
The NFCS is a 5-factor scale that tests for different motivational factors 
that may each contribute to an individual’s general need for closure: 
preference for order and structure, discomfort with ambiguity, 
decisiveness in decision-making, desire for stable knowledge and 
predictability, and closed-mindedness.38 This scale has been translated into 
multiple languages and different versions of it have been used in more 
than one hundred social science experiments, both in the U.S. and 
elsewhere. Most NFC research to date has focused on lay, not expert 
decision making.39  
According to the scale’s principal developer, the need for cognitive 
closure is “involved in all human judgments and decisions and hence its 
effects must be considered value free in principle.”40 For example, low-
NFC individuals may be more receptive to nuance and complexity than 
high-NFC individuals, but they may also be less comfortable and 
consistent in making decisions, and less committed to their clients. 
Conversely, high-NFC individuals may be more decisive and committed 
than low-NFC individuals, but less creative in group processes, less able to 
tailor a message to an audience, and more likely to view conflict in 
competitive rather than cooperative terms.41  
 
36. For example, time pressure, noise and mental fatigue have been shown to increase the need for 
cognitive closure, while accountability to others decreases it.  See, e.g., Antonio Chirumbolo, et al, 
Effects of Need for Closure on Creativity in Small Group Interactions, 18 EUR. J. PERS. 265, 265 
(2004) (summarizing studies).    
37. Donna M. Webster & Arie W. Kruglanski, Individual Differences in Need for Cognitive 
Closure, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1049, 1055-56 (1994). 
38. Kruglanski et al., supra note 35, at 876; Arie W. Kruglanski et al., Psychological Theory 
Testing Versus Psychometric Nay-Saying: Comment on Neuberg et al.'s (1997) Critique of the Need 
for Closure Scale, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1005, 1009 (1997). 
39. Arne Roets et al., Effects of Dispositional Need for Closure and Training on Medical Decision 
Making, 34 MED. DECISION MAKING 144, 144 (2014). But see, e.g., Karl Ask & Pär Anders Granhag, 
Motivational Sources of Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations: The Need for Cognitive 
Closure, 2 J. INVESTIG. PSYCH. OFFENDER PROFIL. 43 (2005) (effect of NFC on criminal investigators’ 
assessment of guilt in a simulated homicide case).    
40. ARIE W. KRUGLANSKI, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CLOSED MINDEDNESS 135 (2004). 
41. Id. at 96-97, 100-105, 122-123 and passim; Agnieszka Golec & Christopher M. Federico, 
Understanding Responses to Political Conflict: Interactive Effects of the Need for Closure and Salient 
Conflict Schemas, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 750 (2004). 
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There is good reason to hypothesize that need for closure variations may 
have an influence on law students’ and lawyers’ predictive judgments and 
fairness assessments when they are engaged in a representative lawyering 
role. Among other effects, high- (versus low-) NFC individuals have been 
shown to have a strong tendency to reduce their discomfort with 
uncertainty by forming judgments quickly and impulsively, based on 
early-received information (primacy effects, or “seizing”); to be resistant 
to subsequent relevant information and persuasion in order to maintain 
their beliefs (irrational belief persistence, or “freezing”); to have undue 
confidence in the validity of their own views (the “true believer” effect); 
and to be less able to generate alternative hypotheses to explain ambiguous 
events.42 NFC variations may also affect the ability of individuals to 
engage in perspective-taking and avoid stereotyping others.43 
Lawyers are called upon to make difficult predictions, based on their 
evaluation of complex and often conflicting evidence, received over time. 
It seems reasonable to hypothesize that high-NFC attorneys may be more 
susceptible than low-NFC attorneys to the influence of their clients’ 
narratives—the first version of events they are likely to hear, as well as 
more resistant to revising their assessments of a matter in light of new 
information learned through witness interviews, review of documents, 
depositions and the like. The fact that lawyers often work in high conflict 
settings, in which parties often engage in negative attributions about their 
opponents, may exacerbate these tendencies.    
 
D. Summary of Precursor Studies 
 
In order to test the effects of dispositional need for closure on lawyering 
judgment, we modified two experiments, conducted in 1993 and 1998 (the 
1993 Experiment and the 1998 Experiment, respectively).44 In the 1993 
Experiment, a group of eighty undergraduate and eighty law students were 
given condensed but identical case file materials from an actual, recently 
 
42. Webster & Kruglanski, supra note 37, at 1057-58 (Study 4). 
43. Shan Sun et al., Does Perspective Taking Increase or Decrease Stereotyping? The Role of Need 
for Cognitive   Closure, 94 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 21 (2016). 
44. Loewenstein et al., supra note 11; Babcock et al., supra note 32. 
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litigated motorcycle accident case, which students were told had been 
arbitrated by a retired Texas judge. Plaintiff Jones was a motorcycle driver 
who suffered injury when he was rear-ended by Johnson, the defendant 
motorist. Jones seeks $100,000 in damages for his injuries. The accident 
occurred in a split second, at an intersection with poor sight lines that 
witnesses say is hazardous. No witnesses saw the actual collision. The 
defendant admits that he had been drinking earlier in the day, but there is 
conflicting evidence about whether he was impaired at the time of the 
collision. The plaintiff may or may not have been contributorily negligent 
in entering the intersection; under Texas law, he will recover nothing if his 
negligence is determined to have exceeded the defendant’s. The physical 
evidence is inconclusive as to how the accident occurred. The plaintiff’s 
“pain and suffering” damages claim appears overstated in relation to the 
medical evidence in support of it. Neither litigant is especially articulate or 
persuasive.45  In short, “Jones v. Johnson” is an ordinary car accident case 
of a kind litigated in state courts every day. It is legally simple, but 
factually ambiguous. If tried to a judge or jury, widely variable outcomes 
are possible.  
Student subjects in the 1993 Experiment were randomly assigned to the 
role of plaintiff or defendant and asked to predict what monetary award 
the judge-arbitrator would order and what settlement outcome would be 
“fair.” They were then paired off and instructed to negotiate in an effort to 
reach a settlement. 46  
Note that, although subjects were told that a judge had arbitrated the 
case and were asked to predict his “award,” this was merely an artifact of 
the experiment. (In actuality, an expert with relevant civil litigation 
experience read the materials and placed a “value” on the case.) The 
researchers were not concerned with how close or far students’ predictions 
were from the (faux) judicial arbitration award or whether their predictions 
were “correct.” Rather, they were interested in whether, and to what 
extent, plaintiffs’ and defendants’ arbitral predictions and fair settlement 
value assessments would differ from each other, simply on account of 
their assigned role. They chose a rich and factually ambiguous case file, 
 
45. Loewenstein et al., supra note 11, at 145-47; “Jones v. Johnson” case materials on file with 
senior author.  
46. Loewenstein et al., supra note 11, at 145-47.  
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with a variety of possible arguments available to each side, because they 
hypothesized that self-serving assessments were more likely to occur in 
such situations than with a simpler, more stylized fact pattern.47  
The researchers found, on average, that students assigned to the role of 
plaintiff predicted an award by the judge that was $14,527 higher than that 
predicted by students assigned to the defendant role, and that their fair 
settlement estimates were $17,709 higher than defendants’—biases of a 
substantial magnitude, given that the judge’s “award” was only $30,560. 
The researchers also found (unsurprisingly) that the larger the difference in 
both predicted judicial awards and fair value assessments within each 
negotiating pair, the longer their negotiations took and the greater the 
likelihood they would experience bargaining impasse.48   
In the follow-up 1998 Experiment, the researchers replicated their 1993 
Experiment. However, they also tested the efficacy of a simple “consider-
the-opposite” (CTO) instruction in de-biasing judgment and improving 
bargaining behavior on the part of 98 MBA students at two different 
schools. The researchers found that a “list the weaknesses in your case” 
CTO prompt (given to half of the plaintiffs and half of the defendants, but 
not to students in the control condition) was highly effective in reducing 
bias and promoting settlement.49 
 
E. Alterations to Precursor Studies 
 
In the current study, we revised and expanded on these two 
experiments, utilizing only law students as our subjects and introducing 
NFC testing as a third variable. We were attracted by the factual ambiguity 
and realism of the original Texas case file materials, and so decided to use 
them again. However, for reasons described below, we made four 
 
47. Id. at 150. 
48. Id. 
49. Babcock et al., supra note 32, at 918-20. In the control condition, students assigned to the 
plaintiff role submitted arbitral predictions that were, on average, more than $20,000 higher than those 
students assigned to the defendant role.  In the de-biasing condition, the average differential in arbitral 
predictions was reduced to less than $5000.  Thirty-five percent of student pairs in the control 
condition failed to settle their case within the 30-minute negotiation period, but only 4% failed to settle 
in the de-biasing condition. Id. For a comparative discussion of the impact of CTO on law students in 
our study, see infra Part IV.A. 
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significant alterations to the design of the original experiments that 
complicate the comparison of our results with those from the earlier ones.   
First, we assigned students to the role of plaintiff’s or defendant’s 
counsel rather than to the role of litigants themselves, in order to 
determine if, as agents, they would demonstrate a similar or different 
degree of partisan role bias as participants assigned to the role of plaintiffs 
and defendants in the two previous studies. (In order to help them assume 
this role, we also gave them some brief instructions on Texas tort and 
evidence law so that they would understand the legal rules that would 
apply to the case.)  
Second, because we were utilizing other professors’ students and not 
our own and wanted them to take the exercise seriously, we increased the 
reward structure for accurate predictions of the judge’s arbitration award, 
from (a largely symbolic) $1 for all valuations within $5000 of the judge’s 
award to a possible high of $100 for predicted valuations closest to that 
award.  
Third, we modified the de-biasing prompt given to half of the students 
in the sample. In the 1998 Experiment, students in the de-biasing groups 
were instructed as follows: 
 
In experiments based on this case we have found evidence of “self-
serving interpretations of fairness.” When we ask plaintiffs and 
defendants to predict the ruling of the judge, and to tell us what they 
think is a fair settlement of the case, plaintiffs’ answers to both 
questions are typically $20,000 greater than defendants’. 
Furthermore, when the difference between the plaintiff and the 
defendant is large—when the plaintiff thinks a much higher 
settlement is fair than does the defendant—the parties are much less 
likely to settle the case and more likely to “go to court” and incur 
legal expenses. This occurs because each side is “holding out” for 
what they legitimately think is a fair settlement. 
 
Disputants don’t always think carefully about the weaknesses in 
their own case and are therefore surprised when the judge’s ruling is 
worse than their expectations. For plaintiffs, this means that the 
judge’s award is worse than their expectations. For defendants, this 
means that the judge’s award is often greater than their 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol59/iss1/12
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expectations. Therefore, please think carefully about the weaknesses 
in your case. In the space below, please list the weaknesses in your 
own case.50 
 
We redacted the italicized sentence from our de-biasing prompts, 
concerned that it might be too suggestive, and retained the remaining 
language.  
Fourth, and importantly, student participants in both the 1993 and 1998 
Experiments were asked the following two questions: 
1. What is your best guess of the amount of the judge’s award? 
2. What do you consider a fair amount for [the plaintiff] to receive in an 
out of court settlement from the vantage point of a neutral third party?  
This wording of question 2 seemed to us to combine, and perhaps 
conflate, two different ways of assessing a case for settlement. As 
previously described, prior research demonstrates that people often make 
fairness assessments based on self-serving, subjective standards, and not 
“from the vantage point of a neutral third party.” To better distinguish 
more objective and more subjective ways of assessing a case, we changed 
the formulation of question 2 to read: “Irrespective of the judge’s award, 
what would you consider a fair amount for [the plaintiff] to receive in 
damages to settle this case out of court?” By framing the question in this 
way, we were attempting to prompt participants to differentiate between 
the outcome they considered most likely and the outcome they would 
deem most just.51 
 
 
 
50. Materials on file with senior author (emphasis added). 
51. Emphases added. We made other minor changes to the original experiments as well. First, we 
changed the name of the case file from “Jones v. Johnson” to “Platt v. Dixon” to more clearly 
distinguish the two litigants and make it easier for participants to remember their assigned role. 
Second, to account for inflation, we updated all financial figures in the case by a factor of 50%, 
including plaintiff’s demand for damages (changed from $100,000 to $150,000) and the judge’s 
arbitration award (changed from $30,560 to $45,840). Third, we administered this survey as an online, 
unmonitored, out-of-class exercise (with a recommended completion time of 45 minutes), rather than 
as in-class, written one. 
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II. METHODOLOGY OF STUDY 
  
A. Hypotheses 
 
Our study was designed to test four hypotheses: First, we expected to 
replicate previous findings of partisan role bias on the part of lawyers and 
law students in a representative role, i.e., we expected that participants 
representing the plaintiff would assign higher valuations to the case than 
those representing the defendant, despite assuming the role of agents 
rather than principals as in the previous two studies.   
Second, we expected that the effects of partisan role bias would be 
greater for participants with high (vs. low) dispositional need for closure.  
Third, we expected to replicate the de-biasing effect of consider-the-
opposite prompts, by demonstrating reduced partisan bias in the de-biasing 
(vs. control) condition.  
Fourth, given their preference for certainty over ambiguity, we 
hypothesized that individuals with a high need for closure would be more 
resistant to de-biasing interventions than individuals with a low need for 
closure.  
 
B. Sample 
 
After receiving IRB approval to conduct the study, we sent out list serve 
solicitations describing its purpose and design to U.S. law professors 
teaching dispute resolution and clinical courses. Fourteen instructors from 
twelve geographically diverse public and private law schools (Arizona 
State, Brooklyn, Case Western Reserve, University of Connecticut, 
Laverne, University of Missouri, New England, University of Oregon, 
Quinnipiac, University of South Carolina, University of Wisconsin and 
Vermont Law School) participated, after securing approvals from their 
home institutions. Instructors were requested to provide the materials to 
their students as an online survey homework assignment, to be followed 
by in-class negotiations based on students’ randomly assigned role in the 
case. The in-class negotiations (which most but not all instructors 
assigned) were not part of our investigation.  
Four hundred and ninety-two participants completed the study online. 
Despite our efforts to eliminate role confusion, twelve participants 
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reported in the debriefing questions being in the wrong role (e.g., 
representing the plaintiff despite having received instructions to represent 
the defendant). In addition, seven participants did not list any weaknesses 
in their case, despite being given a de-biasing prompt instructing them to 
do so. Three participants did not complete the Need for Closure 
questionnaire. One participant completed the study twice and one 
participant received the wrong instructions because of a technical problem 
in the software that was later fixed. We excluded these twenty-four 
participants from the subsequent analyses.  
Thus, the main analyses refer to 468 participants (251 females and 216 
males, 1 participant did not report their gender; Mage = 25.6, SDage = 4.24). 
Of these, 251 were first-year students, 121 were second-year students and 
92 were third-year students. Four subjects were graduate-level or foreign 
students and one subject did not indicate his or her year. Almost all 
participants (455 of 468) had completed at least the negligence portion of 
their required first-year Torts course before taking the survey. Only 142 
participants had completed the study of Evidence. None of these 
demographic variables—gender, year in law school or completed 
coursework--had any statistically significant effect on any of the measures 
tested in this study. 
 
C. Procedure and Materials 
 
All student subjects completed the study utilizing the Qualtrics.com 
online platform. The computer program randomly assigned participants to 
one of four conditions depending on their role in the task (plaintiff’s 
attorney/defendant’s attorney) and whether or not they would receive the 
de-biasing prompt (de-biasing/control). All subjects were provided a 
general information sheet and consent form describing the study. They 
were told that they would read a condensed version of a case file from an 
actual personal injury case in which they would represent either the 
plaintiff or the defendant. They were further informed that they would be 
asked to predict the judge-arbitrator’s award in the case, as well as to state 
what a fair settlement outcome in the case would be, irrespective of that 
award.   
In order to incentivize participants to work carefully on the task, we 
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instructed them that their class instructor would be asking them to 
negotiate with another student in a future class based on the case valuation 
estimates they provided online. As an additional incentive, we promised 
ten monetary prizes (gift cards worth $50 or $100) to participants across 
the entire pool of subjects whose estimations of the judge’s award was 
closest to the “actual” award ($45,840). Participants were also told that 
they could choose to complete a different class assignment (e.g., reading a 
paper) instead of this assignment, but none selected this option. After 
consenting to participate in the study, participants answered a few 
demographic questions and completed the NFC 42-item inventory (See 
Appendix below).  
Next, participants were presented with identical case file materials from 
Platt v. Dixon. The file consisted of 27 pages of information, including the 
litigation complaint and answer, a diagram of the accident site, excerpts 
from party and witness depositions, and documents pertaining to the 
parties’ previous driving records as well as plaintiff’s claimed medical 
expenses and other out-of-pocket damages. After reading these case 
materials, half of the participants were given the de-biasing prompt in 
which they were alerted to the existence of partisan bias in case valuation 
and asked to write down potential weaknesses in their client’s case. All 
students were then asked for their case evaluations, in two parts: 
After reading the case materials, but before you are assigned by your 
instructor to negotiate, please answer the following questions:  
 
1) What is your best guess of the amount of the judge’s award, if 
any, to Platt?  Enter a number between 0 and $150,000 below.  
 
2) Irrespective of the judge’s award, what would you consider a fair 
amount for Platt to receive in damages to settle this case out of 
court? Enter a number between 0 and $150,000 below.  
 
At the end of the survey, participants answered a few questions 
designed to assess whether they understood the instructions and followed 
them as intended. To confirm that the participants knew the role to which 
they were assigned, we asked them to indicate whether they represented 
the plaintiff or the defendant. We also asked participants whether there 
was anything in the instructions for the study with which they struggled. 
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Finally, we asked participants if they could determine the purpose of the 
study. No one guessed the purpose of the NFC Scale.  
 
D. Design 
 
The design of this study was Case Valuation (Judge’s award/Fair 
amount) x Assigned Role (Plaintiff attorney/Defendant attorney) x De-
biasing Condition (Control/De-biasing). The first variable was 
manipulated within participants and the other two variables were 
manipulated between participants. In addition, we measured participants’ 
need for cognitive closure and analyzed the data to determine whether 
high-NFC subjects were more susceptible to self-serving bias and more 
resistant to de-biasing prompts than low-NFC subjects. 
 
 
III. STUDY RESULTS 
 
Before conducting the main analyses to test our predictions, we tested 
the reliability of the NFC scale.52 The obtained reliability was high 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.85), the mean score was 3.78 with 3.5 being the 
midpoint on the 6-point Likert scale. As can be seen from the histogram of 
the NFC scores below (Figure 1), the distribution of the NFC scores is 
normal and tight around the mean (SD = 0.42). ANOVA with role 
(defendant attorney/plaintiff attorney) and de-biasing condition 
(control/de-biasing) as between participants’ factors revealed no 
 
52. Some NFC scholars have argued that the “decisiveness in decision-making” sub-scale on the 
original NFCS is an independent and distinctive dimension, not significantly related to the other four 
factors on the scale. See, e.g., Arne Roets & Alain Van Hiel, Separating Ability from Need: Clarifying 
the Dimensional Structure of the Need for Closure Scale. 33 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULLETIN 
266 (2007). To test the robustness of our findings, we reanalyzed our data to determine if any would 
be affected by dropping the decisiveness sub-scale from our data analysis, as some other researchers 
have done. See, e.g., Stefano Livi, et al., Epistemic Motivation and Perpetuation of Group Culture: 
Effects of Need for Cognitive Closure on Trans-Generational Norm Transmission, 129 ORG. BEHAV. 
& HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 105 (2015). None of the findings presented below was affected by 
this re-analysis. 
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significant differences in NFC among the experimental conditions, p > .21. 
 
 
Figure 1.  NFC scores histogram. 
 
We used a random intercept mixed linear model to analyze participants’ 
valuations of the case.53 Because each participant provided two valuations 
of the case—what could be called an objective valuation—predicting what 
a neutral, impartial judge would award in arbitration, and a subjective 
evaluation—stating what settlement amount, in his or her opinion, would 
be “fair,” we coded the Case Valuation variable as the Level 1 (within 
participant) predictor (-0.5 – the judge’s award and 0.5 – fair amount), so 
that 0 would represent the average of the objective and subjective 
valuations. Similarly, we centered on zero the Level 2 (between 
participants) predictors—the assigned role (-0.5 – defendant attorney, 0.5 
– plaintiff attorney) and the de-biasing condition (-0.5 – control, 0.5 – de-
biasing). Finally, the NFC scores were linearly transformed so that their 
mean would also be centered at zero. The results of this analysis are 
presented in Table 1, below. We then report these analyses for each of our 
 
53. This model is the appropriate model for analyzing data that include both nested data (in our 
design, an arbitral prediction and an assessment of fair value were nested within individuals) and 
continuous predictors (in our design, this was Need for Cognitive Closure. See Judith D. Singer, Using 
SAS PROC MIXED to Fit Multilevel Models, Hierarchical Models, and Individual Growth Models, 23 
J. EDUC. & BEHAV. STAT. 323 (1998). 
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hypotheses. 
 
Note. Participants’ predictions were regressed onto one Level 1 (within participant) predictor Case Valuation 
(-0.5 – the judge’s award and 0.5 – fair amount), and three Level 2 (between participants) predictors—Role (-
0.5 – defendant attorney, 0.5 – plaintiff attorney), the de-biasing condition (-0.5 – control, 0.5 – de-biasing), 
and NFC scores (centered at zero). The letter “K” indicates thousands of dollars. 
 
A. Hypothesis 1: Effects of Assigned Role on Overall Case Assessments 
 
Our first hypothesis was that students randomly assigned to the role of 
plaintiff’s or defendant’s counsel would exhibit partisan role bias in their 
overall case assessments, just as students assigned to a party role had in 
the 1993 and 1998 Experiments. Our findings generally support this 
hypothesis, with some features and differences from the findings of the 
previous Experiments that are intriguing. 
The overall results for students assigned to both the control group and 
the de-biasing group on each side of the litigation are presented in Table 2, 
below: 
 
Table 1: Mixed-level Linear Model 
 B SE t p 95% CI 
Intercept 46699 1392 35.54 0.000   44.0K, 49.4K 
Case Valuation  -1849 1147 -1.61 0.108 -4.1K, 0.4K 
Role 9185 2785 3.30 0.001    3.7K, 14.7K 
De-biasing condition -1333 2784 -0.48 0.632 -6.8K, 4.1K 
NFC 4698 3358 1.40 0.163   -1.9K, 11.3K 
Case valuation x Role 13456 2294 5.87 0.001    8.9K, 18.0K 
Case valuation x  
De-biasing -4136 2293 -1.80 0.072 -8.6K, 0.3K 
Case valuation x NFC -5011 2766 -1.81 0.071  -10.4K, 0.4K 
Role x De-biasing -5199 5571 -0.93 0.351  -16.1K, 5.7K 
Role x NFC 14260 6737 2.12 0.035    1.0K, 27.5K 
De-biasing x NFC -2494 6722 -0.37 0.711  -15.7K, 10.7K 
Case valuation x Role x 
De-biasing 10668 4588 2.33 0.021    1.7K, 19.7K 
Case valuation x Role x 
NFC 910 5549 0.16 0.870  -10K, 11.8K 
Case valuation x  
De-biasing x NFC 4457 5537 0.81 0.421   -6.4K, 15.3K 
Role x De-biasing x 
NFC -6559 13486 -0.49 0.627  -33.1K, 19.9K 
Case valuation x Role x 
De-biasing x NFC -2268 11108 -0.20 0.838  -24.1K, 19.6K 
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Table 2: Case Evaluations by Students Across Entire Sample (Control plus De-biasing 
Conditions)  
 
 Plaintiff Lawyer Defendant Lawyer Partisan Bias 
Overall $ Value 51.3K      (31.9K) 
 42K  
    (28.1K) 
   9.3K**  
      (30.0K) 
Arbitral Prediction 48.9K      (33.2K) 
46.5K  
    (34.0K) 
   2.5K  
      (33.6K) 
Fair Value 53.6K      (35.2K) 
37.5K  
    (27.2K) 
  16.1K***  
      (31.4K) 
 
Note. In all the tables that follow, numbers in parentheses indicate standard deviations. The letter “K” 
indicates thousands of dollars. 
** p < .01 
*** p <. 001  
 
“Overall $ value” in Table 2 represents students’ mean estimates of the 
value of Platt v. Dixon, averaging their predictions of the most likely 
arbitral award and their assessments of the case’s “fair settlement” value. 
“Partisan Bias” refers to the mean difference in overall case valuations 
submitted by plaintiff and defendant lawyers. As can be seen from this 
table, the main effect of role was significant, t(460) = 3.30, p = .001, 
Cohen’s d = 0.31, indicating that, on average, participants representing the 
plaintiff (n = 240; including both those who received the de-biasing 
prompt and those who did not) predicted case values (averaged across the 
fair settlement amount and the judge’s predicted award) to be $9,309 
higher than those who represented the defendant (n = 228). This result 
replicates previous findings of partisan role bias on the part of 
representative lawyers. 
We acknowledge the artificiality of averaging our participants’ arbitral 
predictions and fair settlement assessments to yield a combined “overall 
value” for Platt v. Dixon. We report the measure in this way because it is 
consistent with previous research, which has mostly treated partisan role 
bias on the part of lawyers or law students as a unitary phenomenon. For 
example, in concluding that most lawyers are more overconfident than 
accurate in their litigation forecasts, Goodman-Delahunty and her 
colleagues asked civil and criminal litigators to specify an outcome in a 
pending case that they would consider their “minimum goal” for the case, 
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as well as the probability they “will achieve this outcome or something 
better.”54 The researchers did not ask their subjects whether their specified 
goal was based on an objective prediction of the most likely trial result, 
their sense of what a “fair” outcome would be, or some combination of 
these two factors. Their research design did not distinguish these different 
ways of valuing a case, as ours enabled us to do.    
When in fact we disaggregated these two valuation methods among the 
entire sample of respondents, we found that participants’ “fair value” 
assessments were far more susceptible to partisan role bias than were their 
predictions of the most likely arbitral award. Specifically, plaintiff 
lawyers’ estimates of the fair settlement value of the case were $16,134 
higher than the estimates of those who represented the defendant, t(612) = 
5.28, p < .001, d = 0.51. By contrast, when it came to predicting the 
judge’s most likely award, the difference between the plaintiff lawyer and 
defense lawyer predictions was only $2,483, an effect that was not 
statistically significant, t < 1. This greater susceptibility of participants’ 
fair value assessments to partisan bias was significant, b = 13,456, se = 
2,294, β = .10, se = .02, t(460) = 5.87, p < .0001.  
We then analyzed the results for the students in the control group only, 
so as to be able to compare those results to the findings of the 1993 
Experiment, which did not include a de-biasing condition as part of its 
design. These results are presented in Table 3 below. 
 
54. Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 6, at 139. 
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Table 3: Case Evaluations by Students in the Control Condition Only 
 
 Plaintiff Lawyer Defendant Lawyer Partisan Bias 
Overall $ Value    53.5K   (34.6K) 
   41.2K 
  (29.5K) 
   12.3K**  
       (32.1 K) 
Arbitral Prediction    51.5K         (35.2K) 
   43.3K  
       (33.8K) 
    8.2K*  
        (34.5K) 
Fair Value    55.5K   (37.6K) 
   39.1K 
  (29.0K) 
    16.4K***  
         (33.6K) 
 *  p < .1 
** p < .01 
*** p <. 001 
 
As can be seen from Table 3, random assignment to the role of attorney 
for plaintiff or defendant in the control condition produced a difference in 
overall case evaluations of $12,261, which was also statistically 
significant, t(460) = 2.98, p = .003, d  = 0.38. 
Again, however, when we disaggregated the differences in students’ 
predictions of the most likely judicial arbitral award and their assessments 
of the case’s fair settlement value, different patterns emerged. The 
differential between plaintiff lawyers’ and defense lawyers’ assessments 
of a fair settlement value for the case was more than double the differential 
in their arbitral predictions. In the control condition, the plaintiff’s lawyers 
predicted arbitral awards that were $8,172 higher than those of the defense 
lawyers, t(612) = 1.81, p = .07, d = 0.24, a marginally significant 
difference. By contrast, the plaintiff’s lawyers’ fair settlement value 
assessments were $16,351 higher than those of the defense lawyers—a 
difference that was highly significant, t(612) = 3.70, p < .0001, d = 0.49.  
As in the across de-biasing conditions analysis reported above, this greater 
susceptibility of participants’ fair value assessments to partisan bias was 
significant, b = 8,077, se = 3,262, β = 0.06 , se =0.02, t(460) = 2.48, p = 
.014.  
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We also wanted to compare the magnitude of the partisan bias exhibited 
by students in our control condition to that found in those earlier 
experiments. The effect size of partisan role bias on students’ arbitral 
predictions in our study was much smaller than those obtained by both the 
1993 Experiment and the 1998 Experiment. (Cohen’s d = 0.24 vs. d = 0.42 
and d = 0.76). By contrast, the magnitude of partisan bias in subjective 
fairness assessments in our study was similar to that reported by the 1993 
Experiment (d = 0.49 vs. d = 0.53).55   
 
B. Hypothesis 2: Effects of NFC on Partisan Role Bias 
 
Our second hypothesis—and the main focus of our study—was that our 
data would show an interaction between participants’ Need for Cognitive 
Closure scores and their susceptibility to partisan role bias. Consistent 
with that hypothesis, we found that participants with higher NFC scores 
were far more susceptible to partisan role bias than those with lower NFC 
scores, b = 14,260, se = 6,737, β = .09, se = .04, t(460) = 2.12, p =.035. 
This interaction is depicted in Figures 2 through 4 below. 
 
 
 
55. We reached this conclusion by comparing our effect sizes to the effect sizes for arbitral 
predictions and fairness assessments, based on the mean differences, standard errors and sample sizes 
provided in Loewenstein, et al., supra note 11, at 151 (Table 2, rows 1 and 2) and Babcock, et al., 
supra note 32, at 31, (Table 2, row 3). For potential reasons for this discrepancy, see infra Part IV.B. 
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Figure 2. Partisan bias for overall $ value predicted from individuals’ NFC scores. The solid line 
indicates the critical value of NFC above which the partisan bias becomes significant. The middle, left 
and right dashed lines indicate the mean values of NFC and 1SD below and above the mean, 
respectively. The gray bands represent the 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Partisan bias for arbitral predictions predicted from individuals’ NFC scores. The solid 
line indicates the critical value of NFC above which the partisan bias becomes significant. The middle, 
left and right dashed lines indicate the mean values of NFC and 1SD below and above the mean, 
respectively. The gray bands represent the 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 4. Partisan bias for fair value predicted from individuals’ NFC scores. The solid line 
indicates the critical value of NFC above which the partisan bias becomes significant. The middle, left 
and right dashed lines indicate the mean values of NFC and 1SD below and above the mean, 
respectively. The gray bands represent the 95% confidence intervals. 
 
For each graph in Figures 2 through 4, “critical value” signifies the 
NFC score threshold at which partisan role bias began to become 
significant. As can generally be seen from these figures, the moderating 
effect of NFC scores on students’ susceptibility to partisan role bias was 
similar for all three methods of case valuation, given that the slopes of the 
three graphs are all basically the same. However, in each figure, the effect 
of students’ need for closure scores on partisan bias became statistically 
significant at a different point on the graph.   
In Figure 2, “overall $ value” again represents students’ mean estimates 
of the value of Platt v. Dixon, averaging their predictions of the most 
likely arbitral award and their assessments of the case’s fair settlement 
value. When utilizing this valuation method, the effect of individual NFC 
scores on students’ case valuations became significant just above the 
midpoint of the NFC 6-point scale – at 3.56. In our sample, more than 
70% of participants registered NFC scores at or above this point.  
Again, however, when we disaggregated students’ arbitral predictions 
(Figure 3) from their estimates of fair settlement value (Figure 4), 
different patterns emerged. Recall that we found no statistically significant 
bias in students’ arbitral predictions based on their assigned role: on 
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average, students appeared to be able to predict without bias how a judge 
might decide a factually ambiguous case. Figure 3 is consistent with this 
finding, showing that only 14% of students in our sample—those with 
very high NFC scores (at or above 4.24) -- exhibited partisan bias in their 
arbitral predictions. 
Figure 4 is also consistent with our earlier findings and reveals the 
converse effect: Because most students in our sample exhibited partisan 
role bias in their fair settlement assessments, only students with low NFC 
scores (3.28 or lower, constituting only 11.32% of our sample) were able 
to avoid such self-serving bias.  
 
C.  Hypothesis 3: Effects of CTO De-biasing Prompts on Case Valuations 
 
As described earlier, plaintiff and defendant attorneys assigned to the 
de-biasing condition in our study were asked to generate and list potential 
weaknesses of their case. Because they worked on their own, without 
supervision, we read their responses with some care to try to determine 
how seriously they approached this task. Overall, our assessment is that 
most participants took the instruction seriously and generally listed 
sensible reasons why their client’s case might be questionable, regarding 
both proof of liability and damages.56 On the defendant attorney side, for 
example, one student wrote: “Defendant’s inability to remember [much of 
anything] undermines his stance that he was not impaired by the drinks 
he’d had that day.” On the plaintiff attorney’s side, one student noted: 
“The plaintiff did not get medical help at the scene of the accident and 
didn’t go to a doctor until months later.” The great majority of participants 
listed more than one case weakness; some listed as many as four or five. 
How well did the de-biasing prompt work? Contrary to our 
expectations, it had different effects depending on the case valuation 
method (see Figures 5 & 6). 
 
56. One exception to this was students’ tendency to assume that plaintiff’s and defendant’s previous 
traffic citations would be admissible in court as “habit evidence” -- a highly dubious conclusion. See, 
e.g., Waldon v. City of Longview, 855 S.W. 2d 875, 879-80 (Tex. Ct. App 1993) (defendant police 
officer’s three prior accidents insufficient to constitute a habit). This was an understandable mistake, 
however, given that most subjects had not taken or completed a course in Evidence. 
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Figure 5. Mean estimates of judge’s award (arbitral predictions) by assigned role (plaintiff attorney vs. 
defendant attorney) by the de-biasing condition (control vs. de-biasing). The error bars indicate 
standard errors. 
 
 
Figure 6. Mean estimates of fair value by assigned role (plaintiff attorney vs. defendant attorney) by 
the de-biasing condition (control vs. de-biasing). The error bars indicate standard errors. 
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As was reported earlier, in the control condition (n = 232), partisan role 
bias was marginally demonstrated by subjects in their arbitral predictions 
and significantly demonstrated in their assessments of fair settlement 
value.  As can be seen from comparing Figures 5 and 6, the de-biasing 
prompt (n = 236) effectively eliminated partisan bias regarding 
participants’ arbitral predictions only, Mplaintiff-defendant = -$3,065, se = 4,244, 
p = .51, d = -0.09 and not regarding their assessments of fair settlement 
value, Mplaintiff-defendant = $15,684, se = 3,788, t = 3.77, p < .001, d = 0.54. 
The three-way Role x De-biasing condition x Case valuation interaction 
was significant, t(460) = 2.33, p = .021. These results may suggest that 
consider-the-opposite de-biasing prompts reduce self-serving biases when 
aspiring lawyers are called upon to make an objective valuation—
predicting what a neutral, impartial judge would award in arbitration, but 
not when they are called upon to make a subjective evaluation—stating 
what settlement amount, in their opinion, would be “fair.”57 
 
D.  Hypothesis 4:  Effects of NFC on Susceptibility to De-Biasing Prompts 
 
Finally, importantly, and also contrary to our expectations, we did not 
find any statistically significant differences (p = .63) between high- and 
low-NFC individuals in their receptivity to de-biasing prompts. While this 
lack of effect could be attributable to insufficient statistical power or some 
other design problem, it appears that high-NFC law students are as open as 
low-NFC students to de-biasing strategies designed to reduce partisanship 
in a representative role. These findings may suggest that, while high-NFC 
students have a motivational preference for certainty and closure over 
ambiguity, they have the cognitive capacity to entertain ambiguity when 
prompted to do so.  
 
 
 
57. It is impossible to compare these results to those of Babcock et al., supra note 32, because the 
researchers in that study reported the effects of their consider-the-opposite de-biasing prompts on 
participants’ arbitral predictions only. In addition, as described supra Part I.E, we modified the CTO 
prompt used in that study, confounding the possibility of any direct comparisons. 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
 
Our study is subject to a number of obvious limitations. First, as 
previously noted, we altered several important features from the studies 
we replicated, complicating the task of teasing out firm conclusions about 
the reasons why some of our results differed from those of the studies we 
replicated.  In addition, our sample of participating law students, although 
reasonably diverse in terms of geography and demographics, was not 
randomly selected and may or may not be representative of experienced 
lawyers working on actual cases, with real clients and often high-stakes 
consequences.  
The fact that the survey was administered online, in non-laboratory 
conditions without direct faculty supervision, also presents questions. 
While the great majority of participants completed the assignment within 
the suggested 45-minute timeline, a few completed it faster and a few 
completed it intermittently over the course of several days. This raises 
questions about the level of attention given to the exercise by participants 
and whether they consulted with other students regarding their case 
valuations, rather than working alone.58 On the other hand, the online 
administration of our survey may also have increased the “noisiness” of 
our data, which should have lowered our odds of obtaining significant 
results. The fact that we managed to obtain significant effects despite these 
obstacles makes us suspect that the real effects might be larger. 
These questions and limitations aside, the present study helps us 
understand the workings of partisan role bias on a more granular level than 
previous studies have done, across several dimensions.   
 
 
58. For a summary of the risks and benefits of another online research platform comparable to 
Qualtrics, see Michael D. Buhrmester, et al., An Evaluation of Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, Its Rapid 
Rise, and Its Effective Use, 13 PERSPS. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 149, 151 (2018). (Noting that some studies 
have shown that online participants’ attention is better than the attention of undergraduates in 
comparable in-class experiments.) 
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A. Need for Closure, Partisan Bias and De-Biasing Predictive Judgments 
 
First, taken as a whole, and consistent with our main hypothesis, our 
data suggest that the partisan role bias previously reported in studies of 
real and simulated lawyering behavior cannot be attributed to lawyers and 
law students generally, but is rather moderated by individuals’ need for 
cognitive closure. The greater a law student’s need for closure, the greater 
the risk that he or she will be influenced by self-serving biases in a 
representative role. Partisan role bias, it is thus not surprising to find, 
exists along a continuum. Some students are highly prone to engage in 
self-serving and/or one-sided thinking, many students are somewhat prone 
to do so, and some students may in fact be under-confident about their 
cases and/or too eager to see the other side’s point of view. A simple-to-
administer motivational scale exists that seems to predict individual 
students’ degree of susceptibility to judgmental role biases with a fair 
degree of accuracy.  
Second, despite the fact that we weakened the de-biasing consider-the-
opposite prompt from the one used in the precursor studies, we found that 
all law students—even high-NFC students-- could be prompted to be less 
biased—at least in their predictive judgments.  
Taken together, these two findings have considerable potential 
significance for how law schools train their students to assume the role of 
lawyer. If we want students to be able to overcome their cognitive and 
motivational biases--as well as the bias “blind spot” that affects us all59 -- 
we must help them understand the degree to which they are susceptible to 
self-serving biases in the first place. Students preparing for a lifetime of 
representative lawyering cannot intuitively know where they fall on this 
spectrum. If administered in the classroom, especially in conjunction with 
simulated lawyering exercises like the one used in this study, the NFC 
Scale holds the promise of helping students better understand their own 
tendencies toward self-serving bias in a representative lawyering role.     
Moreover, the success of our consider-the-opposite prompt in de-
biasing even high-NFC students’ arbitral predictions suggests that with 
 
59. Pronin et al., PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL., supra note 17. 
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proper instruction and practice, all law students can not only learn about 
their potential susceptibility to role bias in their legal predictions, but also 
can take effective steps to reduce bias in their predictive judgments by 
regularly practicing modes of counter-attitudinal thinking. 
 
B. Predictive Judgments versus Fairness Assessments 
 
Next, our results suggest that “partisan role bias” may not be a unitary 
phenomenon as previously assumed in studies of lawyering judgment, but 
rather may consist of predictive judgments and fairness assessments 
operating independently of one another. As described earlier, previous 
empirical studies have consistently found that agents (including lawyers) 
are affected by partisan role biases when they assume a representative 
role.60 But no previous studies have attempted to draw as clear a 
demarcation as our study did between predictions of the most likely 
judicial outcome in a case on the one hand, and more subjective 
assessments of its “fair settlement value” on the other.  
The standard economic theory of bargaining suggests that there ought to 
be little difference between lawyers’ predictions of the most likely judicial 
outcome in a case on the one hand, and their advice to clients about what 
constitutes a “fair settlement” on the other. Negotiation instructors 
commonly teach their students how to determine the “expected value” of a 
disputed claim, by objectively evaluating the approximate odds of winning 
the case, determining the most likely damage award, and deducting the 
costs of an expected trial.61 Indeed, the authors of the 1993 and 1998 
Experiments seem to have assumed that survey students’ arbitral 
predictions and fair settlement assessments would be roughly the same. 
Writing in 1995, they commented, “Even when parties have the same 
information, they will come to different conclusions about what a fair 
settlement would be and base their predictions of judicial behavior on 
 
60. See supra Part I.A. 
61. See, e.g., Peter Toll Hoffman, Valuation of Cases for Settlement: Theory and Practice. 1991 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 1 (1991); Nancy A. Welsh, Fairness: Perceptions of Fairness in Negotiation, 87 MARQ. 
L. REV. 753, 760 (2004). 
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their own views of what is ‘fair.’”62  
Our findings suggest that this assumption may not have been correct. 
Although students’ arbitral predictions were only marginally affected by 
their assignment to the role of plaintiff’s or defendant’s counsel, their 
fairness assessments were, on average, highly influenced by their role 
assignment. When participants were prompted to distinguish their own 
assessments of a fair settlement value for Platt v. Dixon from their 
predictions of the judge’s most likely arbitral award, the difference 
between plaintiffs’ lawyers’ and defendants’ lawyers’ fair settlement value 
assessments was double the difference between the two groups’ arbitral 
predictions. 
The large gap we found in plaintiff attorney and defendant attorney 
assessments of the fair settlement value of the case is surprising when one 
considers the rather quotidian nature of the Platt v. Dixon simulation. 
While one might expect fairness considerations to play a significant role in 
partisan assessments of cases involving claims of deliberate misconduct 
(e.g., discrimination, fraud, assault and the like), or difficult relational 
claims (e.g., high conflict divorce cases, messy partnership dissolutions or 
workplace disputes), the case under study was an online simulation of an 
everyday car accident case between strangers. A simple car accident case 
is not the sort of matter likely to produce controversy about the fairness of 
the governing legal rules. (“The principles of negligence may require that 
result, but I think it’s unfair!”) While it is true that the case file presented 
some contested evidence of drunk driving on the part of the defendant, as 
well as a perhaps exaggerated damage claim by the plaintiff, we would not 
have predicted such a strong “fairness” reaction on the part of respondents 
to these materials.     
Nonetheless, these results are potentially significant in light of the 1993 
Experiment’s finding that differences in fair settlement value assessments 
within negotiation pairs were even better predictors of bargaining impasse 
than comparable differences in bargainers’ arbitral predictions. We know 
from highly stylized experiments like the “Ultimatum Game” that 
perceptions of unfair conduct by one negotiator can cause an opposing 
 
62. Linda Babcock, et al, Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REV., 1337, 
1337 (1995) (emphasis added).   
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negotiator to make objectively irrational decisions.63 We would 
hypothesize that clashing fairness norms may play an even greater role 
with practicing lawyers—who have real clients, real adversaries and 
negotiate for real stakes—than they would play in any online simulation 
involving law students. The field would benefit from additional empirical 
research on how objective determinations of case value and subjective 
fairness assessments combine to affect lawyers in their actual negotiations 
and client counseling.  
 
C.  De-Biasing Fairness Assessments 
 
Next, while the “consider-the-opposite” de-biasing prompt we gave 
students was effective in de-biasing their arbitral predictions, it was not 
effective in de-biasing their fairness assessments. How does one explain 
this finding and what are its possible implications?  
In retrospect, this result is perhaps not surprising. Previous research 
suggests that consider-the-opposite prompts are primarily effective in de-
biasing judgments involved in objective and predictive tasks such as 
assessing the evidence regarding the effectiveness of capital punishment in 
deterring crime64 or deciding whether or not to fly the Space Shuttle 
Challenger mission under specified simulated weather conditions.65  
Research suggests that a different de-biasing strategy—perspective-taking, 
i.e., the attempt to prompt people to consider and articulate how the world 
looks to others—is more effective in mitigating egocentric judgments 
about what is “fair” in social or competitive settings. Perspective-taking 
prompts have been shown, for example, to reduce egocentric biases in 
individuals’ views about what is fair pay for themselves versus others on 
an assigned work task,66 their perspectives about the relative value of their 
own contributions to a group project,67 and their views about what is a fair 
 
63. Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 195, 197 (1988). 
64. Lord et al., supra note 18. 
65. Kray & Galinsky, supra note 24. 
66. David M. Messick & Keith Sentis, Fairness, Preference, and Fairness Biases, in EQUITY 
THEORY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 61 (David M. Messick & Karen S. 
Cook eds., 2006). 
67. Kenneth Savitsky et al., The Unpacking Effect in Allocations of Responsibility for Group 
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allotment of resources in settings where limited resources must be 
divided.68  
In legal dispute settings, a perspective-taking intervention might, for 
example, ask a disputant or his lawyer to “step into the shoes” of the 
opposing party, for example by considering how the opponent’s actions 
might have a different and more innocent explanation. (“From Plaintiff 
Platt’s perspective, can you think of some other reason, other than that he 
was inventing his injuries, why he might have waited two months to 
consult a doctor?”) We did not attempt a manipulation of this kind 
because it was not part of the studies that we were replicating.  
Explicit training in taking the perspective of an opponent is not a 
standard a part of the law school curriculum to nearly the same degree as 
is the training that requires students to read judicial opinions and take the 
perspective of a neutral judge. Nor is “fairness” typically much discussed 
in the law school classroom, particularly the kind of subjective fairness 
norms that can strongly affect people in conflict. Further research is 
needed to determine the extent to which perspective-taking prompts 
reduce self-serving assessments of fairness in a representative lawyering 
role, and, if effective, what steps law schools might take to increase such 
training as part of their standard curricula. 
 
D. Lack of Significant Bias in Students’ Arbitral Predictions 
 
Finally, recall the findings of the earlier studies under replication—that 
students were significantly biased in both their arbitral predictions and fair 
settlement value assessments. By contrast, when we asked our student 
participants to distinguish their predictions of what a judge most likely 
would award the plaintiff Platt in arbitration from what settlement 
outcome in the case “irrespective of the arbitral award” they would 
consider “fair,” we found that their fair settlement value assessments were 
highly affected by their role assignment, but their arbitral predictions were 
only marginally affected by them.  
 
Tasks, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 447 (2004). 
68. Nicholas Epley et al., When Perspective Taking Increases Taking: Reactive Egoism in Social 
Interaction, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 872 (2006). 
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How does one explain these differing arbitral results? As one 
possibility, it may be that when students assume the role of lawyer-
representatives, they are somewhat less susceptible to predictive biases 
than when assigned to the role of principals, because of the greater 
distance and objectivity inherent in that role.69 This explanation has a 
surface plausibility and is also consistent with our data, as we found 
smaller mean differences between the plaintiff and defendant lawyers’ 
valuations than the mean differences between the parties’ valuations 
obtained in the previous studies. On the other hand, if representatives are 
really less susceptible than principals to bias, how does one explain the 
persistence of significant partisan bias that we found in students’ fair 
settlement value assessments?      
A second, more likely explanation for our differing arbitral results is 
that the law students in our sample, by dint of their training and experience 
reading judicial decisions, were better able than the non-law students in 
the two previous studies to take external reality constraints into account 
when predicting how a judge might rule in a factually ambiguous case. In 
a well-known book, former Yale Law School Dean Anthony Kronman 
argued that the case method of instruction, used in every U.S. law school, 
instills in students the ability to “suppress all sympathies in favor of a 
judge’s scrupulous neutrality” and helps them make more accurate 
predictions about judicial outcomes and other uncertain legal events.70 
According to this hypothesis, after one or two or three years of reading 
appellate decisions and taking a judicial perspective, the law students in 
our sample would have been better able than the non-law students in the 
previous studies to reason to themselves, “I may think that this case is 
worth [X], but judges are unpredictable, and who knows what this judge 
might do.”  
But this explanation has difficulties as well. The 1993 Experiment in 
fact included eighty law students in its sample. However, the researchers 
found no statistically significant differences between their responses and 
the responses of the eighty undergraduates also in their sample, and 
 
69. Jason Dana & Daylian M. Cain, Advice Versus Choice, 6 CURRENT OP. PSYCHOL. 173 (2015). 
70. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 113, 
122-28 (1993). 
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accordingly aggregated their responses in their analysis.71  
Our finding that law students were only marginally biased in their 
predictions of future judicial outcomes could therefore benefit from 
replication. For example, the 1993 Experiment did not indicate whether 
the law students in its sample were comprised of first-year students only, 
or a combination of first-year and upper-division students, as in our study. 
It seems likely that law students improve in their ability to make 
dispassionate judicial predictions as they progress through their studies. 
Recently, researchers have begun to investigate how novice and 
experienced medical students’ diagnostic skills improve over time and are 
affected by their need for cognitive closure.72 Similar experiments could 
be designed to attempt to document improvements in first, second and 
third year law students’ ability to make objective predictions.   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Representative lawyers are valued, in part, for the accuracy and 
objectivity of the advice they provide their clients. Partisanship and zeal 
are expected of lawyers as well, but partisanship may poorly serve a 
client’s interests if the lawyer’s advice is distorted by biases of which he 
or she is unaware. The present study underscores the importance of 
teaching law students to be self-aware about the unconscious biases that 
may cloud their judgment when they begin to take on a representative 
lawyering role. It provides a method for testing students’ susceptibility to 
judgmental bias on an individual basis. And it provides supporting 
evidence for earlier studies that demonstrate the value of counter-
attitudinal thinking as a de-biasing strategy for improving predictive 
judgment. 
This kind of self-knowledge and training is critical for all law students 
who, as prospective representative attorneys, will soon be giving advice to 
 
71. Loewenstein et al., supra note 11, at 149. The 1998 Experiment included only MBA students in 
its sample. 
72. Roets et al., supra note 39.  See also, Anne Weissenstein, et al., Measuring the Ambiguity 
Intolerance of Medical Students: A Cross-Sectional Study from the First to Sixth Academic Years, 
BMC FAMILY PRACTICE (2014), https://bmcfampract.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1471-
2296-15-6. 
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clients. But no matter what students do with their law degrees after they 
graduate, they can potentially play a vital social role in improving the 
quality of discourse on controversial public issues to the extent that they 
are able to model flexible, nuanced thinking and openness to opposing 
points of view. Viewed from that broader perspective, the kind of training 
described in this article might well be included in every law school 
curriculum.  
The current study leaves unresolved a number of important questions:  
Do law students improve in their dispassion and objectivity of judgment as 
they proceed through law school? If so, by how much, and is this 
improvement moderated by their need for closure? To what extent are 
lawyers influenced by subjective considerations of fairness when advising 
their clients about potential courses of action? In what kinds of contexts 
does this occur, and with what effects? American legal education is 
sometimes criticized for doing a credible job of preparing students to make 
predictions about future legal outcomes, by applying legal rules to a set of 
facts, but a less-than-optimal job in preparing students for the more 
subjective, affective aspects of law practice, in which strong feelings and 
hostile attributions often hold sway, and clashing norms of “fairness” 
compete with one another.73 What, if anything, can law schools do to 
improve in this dimension? Questions such as these would benefit from 
further investigation. Beyond this, the need for cognitive closure may 
provide a heretofore unexplored and potentially useful conceptual frame 
for examining the decision making of other key actors in the legal 
system—practicing attorneys, judges and juries.    
  
 
73. Jane H. Aiken, Striving to Teach “Justice, Fairness and Morality,” 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 6-10 
(1997); Frenkel & Stark, supra note 5, at 53-58. 
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APPENDIX: NEED FOR COGNITIVE CLOSURE SCALE  
(Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) 
 
Please answer the following questions about yourself: 
 
1. I think that having clear rules and order at work is essential for success.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 (Strongly Disagree------Strongly Agree) 
 
2. Even after I've made up my mind about something, I am always eager to 
consider a different opinion. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
3. I don't like situations that are uncertain. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
4. I dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
5. I like to have friends who are unpredictable. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
6. I find that a well ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
7. When dining out, I like to go to places where I have been before so that 
I know what to expect. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
8. I feel uncomfortable when I don't understand the reason why an event 
occurred in my life. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
9. I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a 
group believes. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol59/iss1/12
STARK ARTICLE   8/14/19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2019]  Lawyering Bias and Need for Closure  213 
 
 
 
10. I hate to change my plans at the last minute. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
11. I don't like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect 
from it. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
12. When I go shopping, I have difficulty deciding exactly what it is that I 
want. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
13. When faced with a problem I usually see the one best solution very 
quickly. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
14. When I am confused about an important issue, I feel very upset. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
15. I tend to put off making important decisions until the last possible 
moment. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
16. I usually make important decisions quickly and confidently. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
17. I would describe myself as indecisive. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
18. I think it is fun to change my plans at the last moment. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
19. I enjoy the uncertainty of going into a new situation without knowing 
what might happen. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
20. My personal space is usually messy and disorganized. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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21. In most social conflicts, I can easily see which side is right and which 
is wrong. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
22. I tend to struggle with most decisions. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
23. I believe that orderliness and organization are among the most 
important characteristics of a good student. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
 
24. When considering most conflict situations, I can usually see how both 
sides could be right. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
25. I don't like to be with people who are capable of unexpected actions. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
26. I prefer to socialize with familiar friends because I know what to 
expect from them. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
27. I think that I would learn best in a class that lacks clearly stated 
objectives and requirements. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
28. When thinking about a problem, I consider as many different opinions 
on the issue as possible. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
29. I like to know what people are thinking all the time. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
30. I dislike it when a person's statement could mean many different 
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things. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
31. It's annoying to listen to someone who cannot seem to make up his or 
her mind. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
32. I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life 
more. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
33. I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
34. I prefer interacting with people whose opinions are very different from 
my own. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
35. I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
36. I feel uncomfortable when someone's meaning or intention is unclear 
to me. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
37. When trying to solve a problem I often see so many possible options 
that it's confusing. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
38. I always see many possible solutions to problems I face. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
39. I'd rather know bad news than stay in a state of uncertainty. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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40. I do not usually consult many different opinions before forming my 
own view. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
41. I dislike unpredictable situations. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
42. I dislike the routine aspects of my work (studies). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol59/iss1/12
